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Each day, thousands of lessees enter into contracts under which they 
lease either real or personal property. Under the majority of these contracts, 
the lessee agrees to pay (and does pay) a “security deposit” to the lessor. 
The lessor typically agrees to refund the deposit at the conclusion of the 
lease term if the lessee fully performs its obligations under the lease con-
tract. Is Article 9 relevant to this transaction? Has the lessor taken a “securi-
ty interest” in the lessee’s property to secure the lessee’s obligations under 
the lease contract?
A cursory review of the text of Article 9 suggests that the answer may 
well be “yes.”1 Section 9-109(a)(1) provides that Article 9 applies “to any 
transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal 
property or fixtures by contract.”2 In turn, section 1-201(b)(35) defines “se-
curity interest” as “an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures 
payment or performance of an obligation.”3 Read together, these two provi-
sions appear to encompass a lessee’s security deposit. When the lessor con-
tracts for and receives funds from the lessee, the lessor arguably takes an 
interest in personal property belonging to the lessee. The security deposit 
unquestionably secures the lessee’s obligation to make the bargained-for 
lease payments and to maintain the physical condition of the leased proper-
ty. As a result, it is our opinion that the lessor has a security interest in the 
personal property used by the tenant to pay the security deposit and that 
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Alabama.
** John D. Lawson Professor of Law and Curators’ Teaching Professor, University of 
Missouri. Portions of this paper are adapted from R. Wilson Freyermuth, Are Security Depos-
its “Security Interests”? The Proper Scope of Article 9 and Statutory Interpretation in Con-
sumer Class Actions, 68 MO. L. REV. 71 (2003).
1. The analysis in this portion of the paper assumes that the tenant delivers tangible 
personal property to the landlord, as when the tenant makes a security deposit using cash or a 
check. The analysis differs somewhat, and the application of Article 9 is less clear, if the 
tenant makes the deposit using a credit card or similar payment mechanism. The issues relat-
ed to credit-card and similar transactions are discussed infra notes 114–24 and accompanying 
text.
2. U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1) (2012 Official Text).
3. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (2012 Official Text).
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Article 9 governs the lessor’s rights and responsibilities with respect to that 
property and its proceeds. Some case authority has accepted this straight-
forward textual analysis.4
Unfortunately, most of the decided cases have concluded that a security 
deposit does not give rise to a security interest.5 These decisions inappropri-
ately incorporate into Article 9 a distinction—traditionally expressed in 
landlord-tenant law during the pre-UCC era—between a “debt” and a 
“pledge.” Under this view, title to the funds constituting the security deposit 
is considered to have passed entirely from the lessee to the lessor, with the 
lessee holding only a debt claim against the lessor.6
What difference does it make? There are several reasons why a tenant 
could justifiably care about the characterization of the security deposit. Per-
haps most significantly, a tenant reasonably expects to recover its security 
deposit at the conclusion of the lease term if the tenant has complied with its 
lease obligations, regardless of the landlord’s financial situation vis-a-vis its 
other creditors. But if the deposit belongs exclusively to the landlord—if the 
tenant retains no property right in it—the tenant has only a right of reim-
bursement and no basis for asserting a priority claim as against the land-
lord’s other creditors. As a result, a tenant whose landlord faces financial 
distress may discover that another creditor has attached or garnished the 
landlord’s assets, including the security deposit, thereby diminishing the 
landlord’s capacity to reimburse the tenant.7 By contrast, if the deposit is 
treated as Article 9 collateral,8 the right of the landlord’s other creditors to 
4. Demitropolous v. Bank One Milwaukee, N.A., 953 F. Supp. 974, 980 (N.D. Ill. 
1997) (Article 9 governed security deposit under automobile lease); In re Atlanta Times, Inc., 
259 F. Supp. 820, 827 (N.D. Ga. 1966) (Article 9 governed security deposit under equipment 
lease); In re Verus Inv. Mgmt., LLC, 344 B.R. 536, 542–43 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006) (Article 
9 governed security deposit in form of certificate of deposit in a commercial real estate 
lease); In re Barr, 180 B.R. 156, 160 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1995) (Article 9 governed security 
deposit securing uninterrupted electrical service).
5. See, e.g., Pers. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. GMAC, 169 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D. Conn. 2001); In re
Ford Motor Credit Co. Motor Vehicle Lease Litig., No. 95 CIV 1876 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Law-
son v. Bank One Lexington, N.A., 35 F. Supp. 2d 961 (E.D. Ky. 1997); Yeager v. GMAC, 
719 So. 2d 210 (Ala. 1998); Spina v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 703 N.E.2d 484 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1998); Rosen v. PRIMUS Auto. Fin. Servs., 618 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); 
Dolan v. GMAC, 739 N.E.2d 848 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); Knight v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 
735 N.E.2d 513 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999); Doe v. GMAC, 635 N.W.2d 7 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001).
6. See infra notes 51–55 and accompanying text.
7. The disappointed tenant might have a cause of action for conversion, but this will 
not protect it from the landlord’s trustee in bankruptcy. Under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (amend-
ed 2013), an individual that makes a deposit in connection with the lease of property for 
“personal, family, or household use” but does not obtain the return of the deposit has a sev-
enth-level priority unsecured claim for up to $2,775, but priority at this level provides little 
real protection.
8. Article 9 defines “collateral” as “the property subject to a security interest.” U.C.C. § 
9-102(a)(12) (2012 Official Text).
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attach those funds might be subordinate to the landlord’s obligation to return 
the funds to the tenant upon satisfactory completion of its lease obligations.9
A tenant may also justifiably expect that security-deposit funds will be 
held in a segregated bank account and not commingled with the landlord’s 
own funds (which might increase the risk that the funds would be misappro-
priated or subject to payment to other creditors). If the tenant retains no 
property right in the funds, there are no common-law restrictions that would 
prevent the landlord from placing the funds in its operating account.10 By 
contrast, if the tenant’s deposit is treated as Article 9 collateral subject to a 
possessory security interest in favor of the landlord, then Article 9’s baseline 
rules11 will govern the rights and responsibilities of the landlord with respect 
to those funds. These baseline rules require a secured party in possession of 
collateral to keep it identifiable, although fungible collateral may be com-
mingled.12
Finally, the Article 9 baseline rules provide that if a secured party has 
possession or control of collateral and receives a monetary return on that 
collateral, the secured party must either apply this return against the debt or 
pay it to the debtor, unless the parties’ agreement expressly provides other-
wise.13 Thus, suppose that a landlord places the tenant’s security deposit in 
an interest-bearing account and that the deposit earns a total of $25 of inter-
9. It is conceivable that a landlord might improperly transfer security-deposit funds to a 
transferee that would take free of a tenant’s interest in the deposited funds by virtue of the 
negotiability of those funds. The degree to which a particular transferee might take free of a
tenant’s interest in deposited funds is beyond the scope of this article.
10. In some states, the landlord has statutory obligations with respect to the handling of 
tenant security deposits. For further discussion, see infra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
11. In contract law, one typically would use the term “default rule” to identify the rule 
that would govern the parties’ rights and responsibilities absent a contrary agreement between 
the parties. Because the term “default” has its own distinct significance in the Article 9 con-
text, this article uses the term “baseline rule” rather than “default rule.”
12. U.C.C. § 9-207(b)(3) (2012 Official Text) (“[I]f a secured party has possession of 
collateral . . . the secured party shall keep the collateral identifiable, but fungible collateral 
may be commingled. . . .”). Thus, a landlord holding tenant security deposits could commin-
gle those deposits within a segregated account holding only tenant security deposits.
13. The 1972 Official Text of Article 9 provided that “[u]nless otherwise agreed, when 
collateral is in the secured party’s possession . . . the secured party may hold as additional 
security any increase or profits (except money) received from the collateral, but money so 
received, unless remitted to the debtor, shall be applied in reduction of the secured obligation. 
. . .”  Id. § 9-207(2)(c) (1972 Official Text). As revised in 1998, Article 9 articulated the same 
basic standard in slightly modified language: “a secured party having possession of collat-
eral…shall apply money or funds received from the collateral to reduce the secured obliga-
tion, unless remitted to the debtor.” Id. § 9-207(c)(2) (2012 Official Text). The revised provi-
sion does not contain the “unless otherwise agreed” language used in the 1972 text. Neverthe-
less, the comments to section 9-207(c) make clear that the quoted language merely establish-
es “rules following common-law precedents which apply unless the parties otherwise agree.” 
Id. § 9-207 cmt. 3 (emphasis supplied).
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est during the lease term. If the security deposit is Article 9 collateral, then 
the landlord must either apply that $25 to reduce the tenant’s lease obliga-
tion or pay it to the tenant, unless the parties have contracted out of Article 
9’s baseline rules through contrary lease provisions14 (subject to the possibil-
ity that some other positive law might require payment of interest on the 
deposit).15 By contrast, if the deposit belongs solely to the landlord and the 
tenant holds only a debt claim, the landlord need not pay interest earned on 
the security deposit to the tenant absent an express statutory obligation or a 
contrary contractual agreement.
At present, the Uniform Law Commission is revising the venerable 
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA). Originally prom-
ulgated in 1972, URLTA has been adopted in whole or in significant part in 
21 states.16 While the original URLTA imposes a limit on the size of a ten-
14. As discussed in the text accompanying notes 56–58 infra, Article 9 does not impose 
on the secured party any affirmative obligation to invest collateral in its possession or control 
so as to earn a monetary return. It merely requires that the secured party account for any 
monetary return actually received, unless the parties have contracted otherwise. U.C.C. § 9-
207(c)(2) (2012 Official Text).
15. State statutes could effectively pre-empt the potential application of section 9-207
relative to the issue of interest on security deposits. Statutes in some states place an immuta-
ble positive obligation upon certain lessors to pay to the lessee interest upon the lessee’s 
security deposit. See infra note 57 for a list of state statutes requiring landlords to pay interest 
upon tenant security deposits.
In the consumer lease context, few existing state statutes expressly address the inter-
est-on-security-deposit question. Illinois requires a consumer lessor to place a security depos-
it in a bank account holding only security deposits, and further provides that if that account 
bears interest, such interest must be paid “to the party entitled to the deposit at the end of the 
lease” (the tenant, assuming no default) if the deposit was $150 or more. 815 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 165/3 (2012). Under New York law, if a personal property lease agreement has a term 
of 120 days or longer and requires a deposit of $750 or more, the lessor must place the depos-
it in an interest-bearing account; all interest earned belongs to the lessee with the exception of 
an administrative fee (1% of the deposited amount) that the lessor may impose. N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 7-101(1), (1-a) (McKinney 2013). The landlord cannot disclaim this obligation 
in the lease. Id. § 7-101(2). In all other cases, any interest actually earned by the lessor must 
be paid to the lessee (after the allowed administrative fee). Id. § 7-101(1). By contrast, Wis-
consin statutes make clear that the holder of a security deposit under a consumer lease need 
not pay interest on the security deposit. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 429.203(9) (2011–12).
In 2001, the Uniform Law Commission promulgated the Uniform Consumer Leases 
Act, which (if adopted by a state) would appear to establish that the lessor in a consumer 
lease need not pay interest on a security deposit. UNIF. CONSUMER LEASES ACT § 303(d) 
(2001).
16. See Legislative Fact Sheet—Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N, http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Residential%20Landlord%
20and%20Tenant%20Act (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (noting adoptions in Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Virginia, and Washington).
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ant security deposit17 and addresses the landlord’s obligation to refund the 
deposit and justify any amount withheld,18 it neither explicitly addresses the 
characterization of the deposit nor the landlord’s obligations, if any, with 
respect to the handling of the deposit. The revision of URLTA provides an 
excellent opportunity for the ULC to reconsider the issue of the proper char-
acterization and handling of tenant security deposits.
This Article seeks to assist in that reconsideration. In Part I, we high-
light two opinions representative of the majority of case decisions that have 
treated lessee security deposits as a “debt.”19 These decisions rest upon a 
flawed understanding of Article 9’s scope provisions, and wrongly conclude 
that Article 9 incorporated the “debt-pledge” distinction and excluded secu-
rity deposits from its scope. These decisions exalt form over substance to a 
level that one cannot reconcile with Article 9’s scope provisions—the inter-
pretation of which is properly guided by economic substance rather than 
form.20 For this reason, courts should recognize tenant security deposits as 
Article 9 security interests.21 In Part II, we briefly explore the extent to 
which Article 9's existing provisions appropriately address tenant security 
deposits, focusing particularly upon some potentially troubling differences 
that may follow if a security deposit is not made with property of the debtor 
(such as cash or a check) but is instead made with a credit card or similar 
payment mechanism.22 Part III argues that instead of attempting to modify 
Article 9 to more aptly govern tenant security deposits, the Uniform Law 
Commission should incorporate explicit provisions for the characterization 
and handling of tenant security deposits into the revised URLTA—
provisions that acknowledge the security deposit as a form of secured trans-
action, but that address the expectations of residential landlords and tenants 
more appropriately than the existing provisions of Article 9. Part III con-
17. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 2.101(a) (1972) (amended 1974) 
(“A landlord may not demand or receive security, however denominated, in an amount or 
value in excess of [1] month[s] periodic rent.” (brackets in original)).
18. Id. § 2.101(b) (“Upon termination of the tenancy property or money held by the 
landlord as security may be applied to the payment of accrued rent and the amount of damag-
es which the landlord has suffered by reason of the tenant’s noncompliance with [tenant’s 
obligations] all as itemized by the landlord in a written notice delivered to the tenant together 
with the amount due [14] days after termination of the tenancy and delivery of possession and 
demand by the tenant.”); id. § 2.101(c) (“If the landlord fails to comply with subsection (b) or 
if he fails to return any prepaid rent required to be paid to the tenants under this Act the ten-
ant may recover the property and money due him together with damages in an amount equal 
to [twice] the amount wrongfully withheld and reasonable attorney’s fees.” (brackets in orig-
inal)).
19. See infra notes 30–47 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 48–73 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 74–86 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 87–124 and accompanying text.
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cludes with statutory language proposed for inclusion within the revised 
URLTA.23
II. SECURITY DEPOSITS, THE “DEBT-PLEDGE” DISTINCTION, AND THE 
PROPER SCOPE OF ARTICLE 9
As discussed in the introduction, the weight of authority in the Article 
9 era has concluded that Article 9 does not apply to security deposits.24
Many of the decisions merely rely upon earlier opinions in other states, 
without undertaking significant independent analysis. Rather than summa-
rize all of the decisions, Part IA looks in some detail at two of these deci-
sions—Knight v. Ford Motor Credit Co.25 from the Ohio Court of Appeals 
and Yeager v. GMAC26 from the Alabama Supreme Court—and the justifica-
tion offered by these courts for excluding security deposits from the scope 
of Article 9.27 Part IB critiques these decisions, demonstrating how the 
courts inappropriately relied upon the “debt-pledge” distinction to exclude 
security deposits from Article 9's scope.28 Part IB further demonstrates that 
given the reasonable expectations of the typical parties to a residential lease 
and the broad scope provisions of Article 9, there is no functional reason for 
courts to exclude tenant security deposits from Article 9’s coverage.29
A. Two Representative “Security Deposit as Debt” Cases
The first of the representative security-deposit cases is Knight v. Ford 
Motor Credit Co.,30 which involved the 1995 lease of a Ford Windstar by 
Michael Knight. Pursuant to a lease that the initial lessor assigned to Ford 
Motor Credit Company (“Ford”), Knight paid a $225 security deposit.31 At 
the conclusion of the lease term, Knight sued to recover the interest Ford 
had earned on his security deposit and sought class certification on behalf of 
similarly situated lessees. Knight argued that the security deposit was per-
sonal property belonging to him and that it secured payment or performance 
of his lease obligations; thus, he argued that the deposit was “a security in-
23. See infra notes 125–142 and accompanying text.
24. See cases cited supra note 5.
25. 735 N.E.2d 513 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
26. 719 So. 2d 210 (Ala. 1998).
27. See infra notes 30–47 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 48–58 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 59–86 and accompanying text.
30. 735 N.E.2d 513 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
31. Id. at 514. Knight did not actually pay this amount by cash or check; instead, he 
received a credit for the sum of $225 based upon the stipulated value of his trade-in vehicle. 
Id.
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terest under Ohio law” and that section 9-207(c) governed Ford’s responsi-
bilities with respect to that deposit.32
The trial court rejected Knight’s argument and granted summary judg-
ment for Ford. Relying extensively upon the weight of prior decisions in 
other states, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the security 
deposit created merely a “debt.” The court observed that “[t]o hold that a 
security deposit creates a security interest, i.e., a pledge, would derogate the 
common law principle that a security deposit instead creates only a debt.”33
In support of this conclusion, the court cited the venerable treatise Friedman 
on Leases—which states that under landlord-tenant law, “[i]n most cases a 
security deposit has been held to create a debtor-creditor relation between 
landlord and tenant”34 and that in such a relationship “there is no implied 
obligation to pay interest on the deposit.”35 The Knight court reasoned that 
this principle was so well-established that Article 9’s drafters must have 
intended to preserve it in enacting section 9-207. The court concluded that if 
the Ohio legislature had intended to obligate lessors to pay interest on secu-
rity deposits, it would have done so expressly:
When the General Assembly has intended to impose an obligation to pay 
interest on security deposits, it has done so explicitly and not in an 
oblique manner as the plaintiff contends was done in [UCC § 9-207(c)]. 
Therefore, we conclude that it was not the legislative intent that lessors 
of automobile leases be obligated to pay the lessee interest or profits 
earned on the security deposits.36
The second representative decision is Yeager v. GMAC.37 In May 1995, 
Richard Yeager leased an automobile from Solomon Chevrolet (“Solomon”) 
under a lease assigned to GMAC. Yeager made a security deposit of $350 
pursuant to paragraph 29 of the lease, which provided in pertinent part:
SECURITY DEPOSIT. A refundable security deposit may be part of the 
payment you make when you sign this Lease. We will deduct from the 
security deposit any amounts you owe under this Lease and do not pay. 
32. Id. at 516.
33. Id. at 517.
34. 2 MILTON R. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES § 20.4, at 1291 (Practising Law Insti-
tute, 4th ed. 1997).
35. Id. at 1292.
36. Knight, 735 N.E.2d at 516 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.16 (West 1995) 
(requiring interest on real property lease security deposits in certain conditions); id. § 3733.18 
(requiring interest on manufactured home park and marina rental security deposits)).
37. 719 So. 2d 210 (Ala. 1998).
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After the end of this Lease, we will refund to you any part of the security 
deposit that is left.38
The following year, Yeager sued GMAC and Solomon on behalf of himself 
and similarly situated lessees, alleging that Alabama’s version of section 9-
207 obligated GMAC and Solomon to pay Yeager interest on his security 
deposit. Yeager argued that the terms of the lease and the use of the label 
“security deposit” demonstrated that Solomon and GMAC intended for the 
$350 deposit to secure Yeager’s obligations under the lease, and that the 
deposit thus constituted a possessory security interest in Yeager’s money.
Yeager argued that section 9-207 thus obligated GMAC to remit to Yeager 
(or apply to Yeager’s lease obligations) any money “received from the col-
lateral.”39 GMAC and Solomon argued that although the lease characterized 
the funds as a “deposit” subject to “refund,”40 the lease actually transferred 
outright ownership such that Yeager retained no legal interest in the deposit-
ed funds.41 According to GMAC and Solomon, the deposit created only a 
“debt,” not a “pledge of collateral”; thus, section 9-207 did not govern their 
rights and responsibilities with respect to the deposit, and they had no obli-
gation under Alabama common law to pay interest on a security deposit.42
The trial court granted summary judgment to GMAC and Solomon, and the 
Alabama Supreme Court unanimously affirmed.43
In contrast to Knight—which, like most of the security-deposit cases, 
concluded as a matter of law that Article 9 did not apply to a lease security 
deposit—Yeager suggested that the dispute presented a question of fact: did 
the parties’ lease agreement manifest a sufficient intention to create a securi-
ty interest in the deposit? If so, the Yeager court suggested, then Article 9 
would apply.44 In this regard, the court’s approach in Yeager was consistent 
with existing Alabama Supreme Court precedent in General Electric Credit 
Corp. v. Alford & Assocs., Inc.,45 where the court held that section 9-207
governed reserve accounts held on deposit by GECC under a retail financing 
agreement.46 Nevertheless, Yeager distinguished Alford on the merits—
38. Id. The opinion does not explain whether GMAC took possession of the security 
deposit, or whether either GMAC or Solomon actually invested the deposit in an interest-
bearing account.
39. Id. at 211.
40. See id. at 210.
41. Id. at 211 (“[Yeager] held a contract right to have an equivalent amount of money, or 
some lesser amount, returned to him at the termination of the lease.”).
42. Id. at 210–11.
43. Yeager, 719 So. 2d at 213.
44. Id. at 212–13.
45. 374 So. 2d 1316 (Ala. 1979).
46. The plaintiff in Alford operated a mobile home sales business for which General 
Electric Credit Corp. (“GECC”) provided both wholesale and retail financing. Id. at 1318–20. 
The retail financing agreement provided that GECC could establish “a time sales security 
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concluding that while the agreement in Alford had “specifically” expressed 
the parties’ intention to create a security interest in the reserve accounts, 
Yeager’s automobile lease lacked any such “specific” expression of intent:
If no such intent is specifically expressed in the agreement, then no secu-
rity interest is created. . . . [W]e find no such intent specifically ex-
pressed in the language of the lease agreement executed between Yeager, 
GMAC, and Solomon Chevrolet. The language of the lease, with respect 
to security deposits, does not expressly and specifically indicate that the 
parties intended to create a security agreement.47
The Yeager court thus concluded that section 9-207 did not apply to 
Yeager’s security deposit, and that neither GMAC nor Solomon had any 
positive obligation to pay interest on the deposit.
B. Critiquing the Security Deposit Cases
Neither Knight nor Yeager makes a compelling argument for the con-
clusion that Article 9 excludes lease security deposits from the scope of its 
coverage. Both decisions placed determinative significance upon the distinc-
tion between a “pledge” and a “debt.” The court in Knight viewed these 
characterizations to be mutually exclusive—either the security deposit is a 
“pledge” (with the lessor holding an Article 9 security interest in the depos-
it) or it is only a “debt” (to which Article 9 does not apply). There are three 
problems with this conclusion. First, the courts misunderstood the context in 
which the pledge/debt distinction developed, and thus misapplied the dis-
tinction to the facts of the dispute.48 Second, uncritical acceptance of the 
“debt-pledge” distinction has discouraged courts from engaging in serious 
economic analysis of whether the “no-interest-on-security-deposits” rule 
remains an appropriate baseline rule in interpreting consumer leases.49 Third 
(and perhaps most significantly), regardless of the status of the pledge/debt 
reserve or such other reserve or reserves” as GECC deemed necessary, as security for Al-
ford’s performance under the financing agreements. Id. at 1319. When GECC later terminat-
ed the wholesale agreement and sued for sums allegedly unpaid pursuant to that agreement, 
Alford argued that GECC was obligated to credit to Alford whatever sums GECC had earned 
on the reserve accounts. Id. at 1320–21. The Alford court agreed, concluding that “[t]he intent 
to create a security interest in the reserve funds is specifically spelled out in the retail financ-
ing agreement, wherein it is stated: ‘It is agreed that such reserves are to be held as security 
for and not in lieu of performance.’” Id. at 1322. The Alford court thus held that “the record 
shows a clear and unequivocal intention to create a security interest in personal property (i.e.,
money),” and that section 9-207 obligated GECC to account to Alford for profits earned on 
the reserve accounts. Id. at 1322–23.
47. Yeager, 719 So. 2d at 213 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
48. See infra notes 51–58 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 59–65 and accompanying text.
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distinction under landlord-tenant law, the distinction became irrelevant with-
in the framework of Article 9 once the plain terms of Article 9 swept securi-
ty deposits within its scope.50
1. The Historical Origins of the Pledge/Debt Distinction.
There is a substantial body of pre-Code law that holds that a security 
deposit creates merely a debt as distinguished from a pledge. Yet it is im-
portant to understand the context in which landlord-tenant law developed 
that distinction. Traditionally, landlords commingled security deposits with 
their own funds and used security deposits (and any income earned on such 
deposits) for their own accounts. In evaluating legal challenges to such land-
lord conduct, common law courts articulated three different approaches—
characterizing the transaction as creating either a “trust,” a “pledge,” or a 
“debt.”
A few courts treated security deposits as presumptively establishing a 
trust, with the landlord’s responsibilities for the handling the deposit being 
governed by trust-law principles. Under this view, a landlord’s commingling 
and use of a security deposit for its own account would presumptively vio-
late the tenant’s property rights in that deposit. Furthermore, trust law would 
oblige the landlord to invest the deposit for the tenant’s benefit, and would 
hold the landlord liable for its failure to do so. Because leases typically did 
not establish an express trust relationship regarding the security deposit—
and given the understandable reluctance to view the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship as fiduciary in nature—very few common-law decisions (predomi-
nantly New York courts) characterized a security deposit as a trust.51
50. See infra notes 66–86 and accompanying text. See also U.C.C. § 9-202 (provisions 
of Article 9 with regard to rights and obligations apply whether title to collateral is in debtor 
or secured party) and the explanation of the section in note 102 infra.
51. See, e.g., Donnelly v. Rosoff, 298 N.Y.S. 946, 948 (Mun. Ct. 1937) (“a deposit so
made by a tenant with his landlord constitutes a trust fund, held by the landlord merely to 
secure the payment of rent and the performance of the covenants of the lease”); see also Fore 
Improvement Corp. v. Selig, 278 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1960); Mallory Assocs., Inc. v. Barving 
Realty Co., 90 N.E.2d 468 (N.Y. 1949). The Friedman treatise suggests that these cases in 
fact misapprehended applicable New York precedents. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 34 at 
1292 (cases deeming security to constitute a trust are “for the most part, New York cases 
which were of doubtful validity” before New York’s legislative landlord-tenant reform). For 
further background, see Gilbert E. Harris, A Reveille to Lessees, 15 S. CAL. L. REV. 412, 421–
24 (1942).
A significant number of states (including New York) have enacted statutes that 
explicitly obligate a landlord to hold security deposits in “trust” for its tenants’ benefit. See, 
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-31 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540-A:6 (2006); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 46:8–19 (West 2004); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103 (McKinney 2013); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 27-40-210 (2012). Numerous other states have enacted statutes that create a similar 
relationship without specifically denominating the relationship as a “trust.” See, e.g., CONN.
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Alternatively, a slightly larger number of courts treated a security de-
posit as a “pledge” of the tenant’s property—with the landlord’s responsibil-
ities for the deposit being governed by the common law relating to pledges. 
Under this view, advanced principally in New Jersey and California deci-
sions,52 the landlord could legally commingle the deposit with its own oper-
ating funds, and was under no positive duty to invest the deposit on the ten-
ant’s behalf. Still, the landlord could not permanently dispose of the deposit, 
at least for a reason unrelated to the tenant’s lease obligations. Further, 
though the landlord had no duty to invest the deposit on the tenant’s behalf, 
any return that the landlord did earn on the deposit was considered the ten-
ant’s property.53
Rather than characterize a security deposit as a “trust” or a “pledge,” 
however, most courts resolving landlord-tenant disputes merely character-
ized the deposit as a “debt.” Under this view, the landlord had no duty to 
invest the deposit on the tenant’s behalf. Title to the deposited funds passed 
to the landlord as soon as the tenant made the deposit. The landlord could 
commingle the deposit with the landlord’s other funds and use the deposited 
funds as it wished without liability to the tenant; further, the landlord could 
retain any interest actually earned on the deposit. The tenant retained no 
interest in the money at all, but held merely a contractual claim against the 
landlord for reimbursement.54 In adopting this characterization, courts often 
relied upon the fact that the typical lease placed no express contractual re-
straints upon the lessor’s conduct with respect to handling the deposit.55 By 
characterizing the deposit as a “debt,” courts vindicated the standard com-
mercial practices of landlords—in a fashion that gave lip service to the “pre-
sumed” intention of both landlord and tenant.
With this background in view, the first problem with the security-
deposit cases becomes apparent. The court in Knight assumed that if it had 
GEN. STAT. ANN § 47a-21 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5514(b) (West 2013); MD.
CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-203 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 15B (2005); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 47-16-07.1 (2009).
52. Partington v. Miller, 5 A.2d 468, 471 (N.J. 1939); Cummings v. Freehold Trust Co., 
191 A. 782, 783 (N.J. 1937); Boteler v. Koulouris, 37 P.2d 136, 137 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1934). See also Harris, supra note 51, at 416–21.
53. Ingram v. Pantages, 86 Cal. Ct. App. 41, 44–45, 260 P. 395, 396 (1927). Most com-
mentators have concluded that section 9-207, which sets forth the rights and responsibilities 
of a secured party in possession of collateral, essentially codified the normal incidents of the 
pledgor-pledgee relationship. See, e.g., 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL 
PROPERTY § 42.1, at 1128 (section 9-207 reflects “evident intent of codifying the common 
law [regarding pledgor-pledgee relationship] without substantial change”).
54. For a summary of cases adopting this view, see Harris, supra note 51, at 413–16.
55. See, e.g., Levinson v. Shapiro, 263 N.Y.S. 585, 588 (N.Y. App. Div. 1933) (“The 
nub of the matter is that if the parties had desired to restrict the landlord in the use of the 
moneys, they would have so provided by appropriate language.”).
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characterized Knight’s deposit as a “pledge”—i.e., if it had ruled that UCC 
section 9-207 governed the deposit—it would have reversed the common-
law principle that landlords had no positive obligation to pay interest on 
security deposits absent express agreement. But this assumption is incorrect; 
the Knight court erroneously conflated two entirely different questions. 
Whether a lessor’s security deposit constitutes an Article 9 security interest 
is a separate question from whether the lessor is obligated to pay interest on 
that deposit. Characterizing the lessor’s security deposit as an Article 9 se-
curity interest (the effective equivalent of a common-law “pledge”) would 
not by itself have reversed the common law principle that a landlord had no 
positive obligation to invest a security deposit for the tenant’s account. A 
pledgee had no such obligation under common law, and section 9-207(c) 
codified pre-Code law governing the pledgor-pledgee relationship.56 Section 
9-207(c) does not obligate a party holding funds as security to invest them in 
an interest-bearing account in the absence of an express contractual obliga-
tion to do so. If courts rule that Article 9 governs a security deposit, the les-
sor would have to pay interest to the lessee only if (a) the lease or other 
positive law expressly so required57 or (b) the lessor actually earned a return 
56. GILMORE, supra note 53 at 1128 (section 9-207 reflects “evident intent of codifying 
the common law [regarding pledgor-pledgee relationship] without substantial change”).
57. In the landlord-tenant context, a significant number of state legislatures have im-
posed on landlords a positive duty to pay interest upon security deposits.  See, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1431(B) (2000) (mobile home landlords) (5% annual interest); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-21 (2012) (average rate of insured savings institutions); 765 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 715/1 (2013) (passbook savings rate of state’s largest commercial bank on de-
posits held longer than six months); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 9098 (1997) (mobile 
home landlords) (interest earned or “reasonable” rate, defined as “interest calculated at the 
Federal Reserve Bank, secondary market, annual interest rate on a 6-month certificate of 
deposit for each year in which the deposit has been held calculated as of the first business day 
of each year”); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-203 (West 2006) (3% simple interest); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 15B(3)(b) (2005) (5%, or actual interest earned if less, on depos-
its held one year or longer); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504B.178(2) (2010) (1% simple interest); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540-A:6 (2006) (rate paid on savings accounts at institution holding 
the deposit, on deposits held one year or longer); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-19 (West 2004) (all 
interest earned belongs to tenant, less administrative fee; deposit must be placed in interest-
bearing account); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103 (McKinney 2013) (same); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 47-16-07.1 (2009) (all interest earned belongs to tenant where lease term is nine 
months or longer; deposit must be placed in interest-bearing account); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5321.16(A) (West 2013) (5% on deposits exceeding $50 or one month’s periodic rent, 
where tenant remains in possession for six months or longer); 68 PA. CONSOL. STAT. § 
250.511b (2013) (landlord must pay interest on deposits held for more than two years, less 
1% administrative fee); VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-248.15:1(B) (2013) (4% below discount rate, on 
deposits held greater than 13 months). By contrast, Florida does not obligate landlords to 
place deposits in interest-bearing accounts, but obligates those who do so to pay to tenants 
either 5% simple interest or 75% of the interest actually earned by the deposits. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 83.49(1) (West 2013).
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on the deposit and the lease did not expressly disclaim an obligation to pay 
those earnings to the lessee. The courts deciding the security deposit cases 
could have reached this result without having to express an opinion about 
the merits of the traditional common-law rule that landlords have no positive 
duty to invest tenant security deposits.58
2. What Is the Reasonable Understanding of the Term “Security De-
posit”? 
As discussed above, while the security-deposit cases pay lip service to 
presumed intent, there is reason to doubt that characterizing a security de-
posit as merely a “debt” reflects the shared understanding of the reasonable 
landlord and tenant. The “debt” characterization is most obviously betrayed 
by the parties’ own terminology—they label the transaction as a “security 
deposit.” The “debt” characterization requires a presumption that the rea-
sonable tenant understands and agrees that: (a) the tenant will have no prop-
erty right in the deposited funds once paid to the landlord; (b) the tenant will 
have no priority right in the funds against the landlord’s other creditors un-
less other positive law grants such a right; (c) the landlord may use the funds 
as it wishes absent other positive law to the contrary; and (d) any return on 
In a few states, legislatures have enacted general statutory landlord-tenant reforms, 
but those statutes expressly relieve the landlord of any obligation to pay interest on security 
deposits (absent a contrary lease agreement). See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-209(2)(b) 
(2013) (mobile home landlords) (interest earned on deposit may be retained by landlord as 
compensation for administering deposit); IOWA CODE § 562A.12(2) (2013) (interest earned 
on deposit during first five years constitutes property of landlord); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-
25,108(b) (mobile home landlords) (interest earned on deposit constitutes property of land-
lord); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-10-10(B) (2013) (mobile home landlords) (interest earned on 
deposit may be retained by landlord as compensation for administering deposit); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 41, § 115(B) (2013) (landlord may return deposit “without interest”); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 59.18.270 (2011) (landlord need not pay interest earned on security deposits absent 
contrary written agreement); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.20.170 (2013) (mobile home land-
lords) (same).
In a number of states, legislation obligates landlords to place deposit funds in a bank 
account containing only security deposits—and to hold those funds “in trust” or “for the 
benefit of” the tenant—but without expressly addressing the allocation of interest earned. 
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.070(c) (2013); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1950.5(d) (West 2013); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5514(b) (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-31 (2006); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 521-44(b) (2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.300(2) (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-
40-210 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-28-301(a) (2012). Presumably, under the existing 
common law rules, these statutes would obligate landlords to pay interest on security deposit 
if courts in those states interpreted the statutes to establish an actual trust relationship be-
tween landlord and tenant with respect to the deposit.
58. As explored infra notes 59–65 and accompanying text, it is by no means clear that 
the traditional common law rule states an appropriate “gap-filler” regarding the landlord’s 
obligation to pay interest in cases where the lease is silent.
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the deposited funds belongs to the landlord. Essentially, the transaction con-
templated by the “debt” characterization is an interest-free loan from the 
tenant to the landlord. But the parties do not call the deposit an “interest-
free loan.” They call it “security”—and that label is consistent with the ten-
ant’s expectations regarding the purpose and use of the funds.
Courts in the security-deposit cases have uncritically accepted that the 
traditional common-law rule (i.e., no interest on security deposits unless the 
lease expressly so provides) provides an appropriate baseline rule. But there 
is little reason to view this as an appropriate “gap-filling” rule, or to con-
clude that Article 9’s drafters viewed it as such. In a hypothetical “one land-
lord vs. one tenant” negotiation, the lessee might well forgo a claim to inter-
est on the deposit if the lessor’s administrative costs of investment, record-
keeping, and reimbursement would exceed the interest actually earned on 
the deposit. Otherwise, the lessee might have to bear the higher rent that the 
lessor would demand to carry the duty to pay interest.59 But most commer-
cial landlords negotiate with hundreds or thousands of tenants, and econo-
mies of scale reduce the lessor’s administrative costs dramatically on a per-
lessee basis. The lessor’s total costs may well be less than the total interest 
the lessor could accrue on all aggregated security deposits. If individual 
lessees could organize and bargain collectively, a reasonable lessor might be 
compelled to agree to pay interest on security deposits, or to accept lessee 
demands for rent concessions to offset the forgone interest.
In the real world, of course, lessees negotiate leases individually, and 
no individual lessee has a sufficient financial incentive to negotiate for and 
obtain the lessor’s general commitment to pay interest on all security depos-
its. As a result, lessees can only bargain collectively in an indirect fashion—
through legislatures—where the structural barrier to collective bargaining is 
more easily overcome. By enacting legislation obligating lessors to pay in-
terest on security deposits, the legislature may be seen as bargaining on be-
half of diffuse lessees, accomplishing the bargain that unimpeded collective 
bargaining presumptively would have produced.60
The traditional argument also assumes equality of bargaining power 
between lessors and lessees—an assumption that is largely false in the con-
text of consumer/residential leases. Certainly, the lessor benefits from the 
use of the lessee’s money during the lease term, even if that benefit is less 
than the administrative cost of accounting for it. Thus, under the traditional 
59. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 91–93 (4th ed. 
1992) (discussing use of economic analysis in filling contractual gaps).
60. See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 715/1 (2013) (landlord with 25 or more units obli-
gated to pay interest on deposits held more than six months); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-19
(West 2004) (landlord with ten or more units obligated to pay interest on deposits); N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103 (McKinney 2013) (landlord with six or more units obligated to pay 
interest on deposits).
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argument, one might expect that market forces would compel the lessor to 
accept a slight rent concession to avoid incurring the administrative costs of 
accounting for interest on lessee security deposits. But to the extent that 
residential lessors have systematically greater bargaining power than les-
sees, lessors may instead refuse to make any rental concession and pocket 
this benefit for themselves.
In recent years, many states in fact have recognized that a landlord’s 
commingling and use of a tenant’s security deposit for the landlord’s own 
account violates the reasonable expectations of the typical residential tenant. 
Further, they have acknowledged that residential tenants lack the bargaining 
power needed to negotiate meaningful constraints on the landlord’s handling 
of deposits. As a result, many state legislatures have displaced the common 
law rules with statutory provisions requiring the landlord to hold a tenant’s 
security deposit in trust for the tenant or to segregate it from other funds,61
and some have chosen to make these regulations nonwaivable.62 Some of 
these statutes further impose upon the landlord an affirmative obligation to 
pay interest on the deposit.63
One might take two different views of these state statutes. One might 
view them as a policy-based rejection of contrary common law principles, 
driven by real or perceived bargaining power inequalities and implemented 
to constrain rent-seeking behavior by landlords. Under this view, a court in a 
state without such a statute would presumably continue to conclude that 
lessors should have no positive duty to pay interest on lessees’ security de-
posits.64 Alternatively, one might treat such statutes as recognizing the hypo-
61. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.070(c) (2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-209(2)(b) 
(2013) (mobile home parks); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-21 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 25, § 5514(b) (2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.49(1) (West 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-31
(2006); IOWA CODE § 562A.12(2) (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-25,108(b) (2013) (mobile 
home parks); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-203(d) (West 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 186, § 15B (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540-A:6 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-19
(West 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-10-10(B) (2013) (mobile home parks); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAW § 7-103(3) (McKinney 2013); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 233(4) (McKinney 2009) (mo-
bile home parks); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-50; N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-07.1 (2013); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 41, § 115(A) (2013); 68 PA. CONSOL. STAT. § 250.511b (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. §
66-28-301(a) (2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.270 (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 59.20.170 (West 2013) (mobile home parks).
62. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-4(a)(4) (West 2013) (lease cannot disclaim 
landlord’s obligation to pay interest on deposit); MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROP. § 8-203(j) 
(West 2013) (same); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540-A:8(III) (2013) (same).
63. For a comprehensive list of these statutory provisions, see supra note 57.
64. See, e.g., Korens v. R.W. Zukin Corp., 212 Cal. App. 3d 1054, 1058, 261 Cal. Rptr. 
137, 139 (1989) (refusing to create judicial rule “requiring the payment of interest on security 
deposits when the legislature has declined to do so”) (citing Suzette Clover, Comment, Inter-
est On Security Deposits—Benefit or Burden To Tenant?, 26 UCLA L. REV. 396, 399–400
(1978)).
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thetical lessor-lessee bargain absent structural barriers to collective negotia-
tion. Under this latter view, courts in states without a statute might well con-
clude that evolving common-law principles should place a positive duty 
upon landlords to pay interest on security deposits, absent an express contra-
ry agreement between the parties. Unfortunately, by uncritically accepting 
the common-law no-interest-on-security-deposits rule, the security-deposit 
cases have not explored these alternative views at all—which is somewhat 
surprising, given the significant influence that economic analysis has played 
in transforming the landlord-tenant relationship.65
3. Focusing Properly on Article 9’s Scope Provisions
More fundamentally, the security deposit cases simply disregard Arti-
cle 9’s scope provisions. After the adoption of Article 9, the common law’s 
historical pledge/debt dichotomy as articulated in pre-Code landlord-tenant 
cases became irrelevant. Even if a security deposit creates a debt owing 
from the lessor to the lessee, that premise does not lead to a conclusion that 
the security deposit is not an Article 9 security interest. If the lessor holds a
deposit as security for the lessee’s obligations, the deposit creates both a 
“debt” (to the extent that the landlord is obligated to repay the funds) and an 
Article 9 “security interest” in the deposit.
As at least one of the security-deposit cases conceded,66 one cannot 
reconcile decisions like Knight and Yeager with the breadth of Article 9’s 
scope provisions. The world of Article 9 is (or is supposed to be) a world of 
substance over form. Article 9 governs if the parties intended to enter into 
an agreement in which rights in property secure payment or performance of 
an obligation; whether the parties intend that such an agreement should or 
should not be governed by Article 9 is irrelevant.67 As we have explained 
65. For example, in recent years courts have shown a willingness to use contract law 
principles, where appropriate, to imply into leases obligations going beyond those traditional-
ly imposed by landlord-tenant law. See, e.g., Schneiker v. Gordon, 732 P.2d 603 (Colo. 1987) 
(obligating landlord to mitigate loss caused by tenant’s abandonment of premises); Pugh v. 
Holmes, 405 A.2d 897 (Pa. 1979) (adopting implied warranty of habitability). See generally
Charles J. Goetz, Wherefore the Landlord-Tenant Law “Revolution”?—Some Comments, 69 
CORNELL L. REV. 592 (1984).
66. See, e.g., Doe v. GMAC, 635 N.W.2d 7, 10 (Wis. 2001) (“Were we writing on a 
clean slate, we might be receptive to [the] argument that the security deposit provision in her 
lease agreement with GMAC was ‘intended to create a security interest’ as provided [in Arti-
cle 9].”).
67. See U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 2, which states, “When a security interest is created, this 
Article applies regardless of the form of the transaction or the name that parties have given to 
it. Likewise, the subjective intention of the parties with respect to the legal characterization of 
their transaction is irrelevant to whether this Article applies, as it was to the application of 
former Article 9 under the proper interpretation of former Section 9-102.” The latter sentence 
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elsewhere, “[w]ith parties sometimes disposed to disguise the true nature of 
their transactions, courts cannot simply accept their expressions of intention 
as controlling.”68 The appropriate inquiry is whether the parties entered into 
a transaction in which they used property to secure payment or performance 
of an obligation—if so, then Article 9 applies regardless of the parties’ sub-
jective intention, unless Article 9 expressly excludes that transaction from 
its scope.
Both the text of Article 9 and its comments contemplate that parties can 
create a security interest in money.69 Thus, if one party requires another par-
ty to deposit money to secure the depositor’s payment or performance obli-
gations to the depositee, a security interest in money arises unless Article 9’s 
scope provisions explicitly exclude that transaction. Yet Article 9’s scope 
provisions contain no express exclusion for security deposits.70 Furthermore, 
a security deposit serves the exact same economic function as a possessory 
security interest in money. If the security-deposit cases are correct, any party 
using funds to secure payment or performance of an obligation could opt out 
of Article 9 altogether simply by calling the transfer of the funds a “security 
deposit.” Given Article 9’s generally expansive scope provisions and its 
warning that courts should interpret them by reference to economic sub-
stance rather than legal form, courts are simply wrong to conclude that Arti-
cle 9 excludes security deposits. With respect to its scope, Article 9 is not a 
baseline rule from which parties are free to opt out by contract—and courts 
was added to the comment in 2010 to emphasize what had always been the correct interpreta-
tion of the requirement that security interests arise from contracts.
68. WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, WILLIAM H. HENNING & R. WILSON FREYERMUTH,
UNDERSTANDING SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 1.03[A], at 12 (5th ed. 2012). Section 1-
201(b)(35)’s definition of “security interest” makes this explicit in authorizing courts to re-
characterize as a “security interest,” in appropriate cases, a transaction that the parties them-
selves labeled as a “lease.” U.C.C. § 1-203 (2012 Official Text).
69. See U.C.C. § 9-313(a) (2012 Official Text) (“[A] secured party may perfect a securi-
ty interest in . . . money . . . by taking possession of the collateral.”); id. § 9-332(a) (“A trans-
feree of money takes the money free of a security interest unless the transferee acts in collu-
sion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party.”); id. § 9-313 cmt. 2 (“[Sec-
tion 9-313] permits a security interest to be perfected by the taking of possession only when 
the collateral is goods, instruments, tangible negotiable documents, money, or tangible chattel 
paper”); id. § 9-310 cmt. 2 (“[F]iling ordinarily [does not] perfect a security interest in . . . 
money”); id. § 9-315 cmt. 2 (“Section 9-332 enables . . . most transferees of money to take 
free of a perfected security interest in the . . . money.”).
70. Id. § 9-109(d). Article 9 does exclude “a landlord’s lien” from Article 9, U.C.C.§ 9-
109(d)(1), as well as “the creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real property, includ-
ing a lease,” id. § 9-109(d)(11). However, the comments make clear that this exclusion ap-
plies to “interests in or liens on real property” and that these exclusions merely “reiterate the 
limitations on coverage (i.e., ‘by contract,’ ‘in personal property and fixtures’) made explicit 
in [Section 9-109(a)(1)’s general scope provision].” Id. § 9-109 cmt. 10. Neither of these 
sections would thus exclude a security deposit from Article 9’s scope.
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most certainly should not interpret Article 9’s scope provisions to make it 
so.
Further, section 303 of the Uniform Consumer Leases Act (UCLA) 
strongly reinforces the conclusion that a security deposit is an Article 9 se-
curity interest.  Section 303(a) provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided 
in subsection (b), a consumer lease . . . may not provide for the creation of a 
security interest in personal or real property of the lessee to secure the pay-
ment of obligations arising from the lease.”71 Section 303(b) then provides 
that a consumer lease “may provide for . . . a security deposit.”72 By treating 
security deposits as a subset of the broader term “security interest”—and 
allowing them as an exception to its general prohibition against the lessor’s 
taking of security—UCLA essentially recognizes that a security deposit in a 
consumer lease is an Article 9 security interest.73
4. Conclusion
Even if courts properly treated security deposits as Article 9 security 
interests, most existing lease transactions would not render lessors and/or 
assignees liable for interest on security deposits unless the state’s statute 
obligated the payment of interest. Absent such a statute, the landlord can 
(and typically does) ensure that its lease provides no obligation to invest the 
funds on the tenant’s behalf or to pay the tenant interest on the deposit. As a 
result, there is no functional reason for courts to interpret Article 9 to ex-
clude lease security deposits from its scope.74
71. UNIF. CONSUMER LEASES ACT § 303(a) (2001). The UCLA defines the term “security 
interest” to have the identical meaning as the same term under the UCC. Id. § 102(b)(9).
72. Id. § 303(b)(1).
73. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (UCCC) § 3.301(2) (1974) provides a comparable 
provision and thus gives rise to a comparable inference. Likewise, substantially comparable 
provisions already exist in a number of states that have adopted provisions based upon the 
UCCC. See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 636/30 (2012); IOWA CODE § 537.3301(2) (2013); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-407(2) (2002); WIS. STAT. § 422.417(2) (2011–2012); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 40-14-241(b) (2013).
74. Treating the security deposit as a security interest in money would have no practical 
consequences for the lessor’s enforcement of its rights. While Article 9 requires the secured 
party to dispose of collateral after default in a “commercially reasonable” fashion, U.C.C. § 
9-610(b) (2012 Official Text), the secured party would “dispose” of money collateral simply 
by applying it to the debt. Accordingly, the “reasonableness” of any such disposition would 
focus solely upon the lessor’s mathematical calculation of the debt. Further, the lessor would 
not have to provide notification to the lessee or other parties prior to enforcement (unless the 
lease agreement provided to the contrary), as money is customarily exchanged in a recog-
nized market and Article 9 excuses notice in such circumstances. See id. § 9-611(d).
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In his work on the interpretive challenges presented by drafting errors 
within Article 9,75 Professor Gregory Maggs articulated five general guide-
lines for courts in interpreting Article 9’s provisions: (1) courts should gen-
erally interpret the Code in accordance with its purposes;76 (2) courts should 
establish a presumption of codification, not revision;77 (3) courts should 
recognize that the Code establishes mostly baseline rules;78 (4) courts should 
appreciate the need for uniformity;79 and (5) courts should adopt inclusive 
approaches to scope questions.80 Considering these guidelines confirms the 
lack of any functional justification for courts to interpret Article 9 as exclud-
ing security deposits. Guidelines (1) and (5) most clearly argue for inclusion 
of the security deposit. Article 9’s primary purpose was to consolidate the 
mélange of pre-Code security devices within the unitary conception of the 
“security interest,”81 and the Code clearly directs that courts should resolve 
scope-related issues by reference to economic substance rather than legal 
form or location of title.82 Plainly, courts should not permit the parties to 
“opt out” of Article 9’s scope altogether merely by characterizing a security 
device as a “deposit.” 
75. Gregory E. Maggs, Patterns of Drafting Errors in the Uniform Commercial Code 
and How Courts Should Respond to Them, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 81.
76. See id. at 117. Section 1-103(a) directs that the Code “must be liberally construed 
and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.” U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2012 Offi-
cial Text).
77. Maggs, supra note 75, at 117–18 (“Unless something indicates otherwise, courts 
should presume the drafters intended only to preserve the previous rule.”).
78. Id. at 118 (“The ability of parties to contract around most of the rules in the UCC 
should give courts some comfort when confronting gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities in the 
UCC. No matter what choices they make, their decisions may have only a limited effect on 
future cases. If parties in the future want a different rule, they generally can establish one in 
their contracts. With this idea in mind, courts often should have two goals when selecting the 
meaning of a UCC provision that they otherwise cannot interpret. First, courts should select 
the rule that most parties in the future will favor to save them the effort of having to contract 
around it. Second, courts should make clear what choice they have made so that parties in the 
future may revise the rule by agreement if they choose.”).
79. Id. at 119 (“Although courts do not have to follow UCC [sic] precedents from other 
jurisdictions, they often should do that. Nonuniformity among jurisdictions may hinder the 
planning of interstate commercial transactions and increase the cost of resolving disputes.”).
80. Id. at 119–20.
81. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 1 (2012 Official Text); 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY 
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 9.1, at 288–90 (1965).
82. See U.C.C. § 9-202 cmt. 2 (2012 Official Text) (location of title irrelevant with 
respect to rights and responsibilities of parties to a secured transaction). The substance-over-
form directive is most clearly demonstrated in section 1-203, which prevents avoiding the 
consequences of Article 9 merely by characterizing a security agreement as a “lease” gov-
erned by the common law of leasing. See U.C.C. § 1-203 cmt. 2 (2012 Official Text) (scope 
of “security interest” to be informed by “economics” rather than parties’ subjective intent as 
manifested by formal labels).
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Properly understood, guideline (2)—the presumption of codification—
does not justify excluding lease security deposits from Article 9 security 
interests. Courts in the security-deposit cases (as in Knight) have concluded 
that because pre-Code common law clearly established that lessors had no 
duty to pay interest on security deposits, it should be assumed that the draft-
ers effectively codified that rule. But, as explained above,83 such a conclu-
sion is a non sequitur. Section 9-207(c) does not establish a baseline rule 
positively obligating a secured party to pay interest on money collateral held 
in its possession. Section 9-207(c) instead codified pre-Code rules govern-
ing pledges. Under these rules the pledgee had no duty to invest the collat-
eral on the pledgor’s behalf, but did have to account for the earnings if the 
collateral was invested. Courts have not treated this as a mere codification of 
pre-Code pledge law, but as evidence that Article 9’s scope provision im-
plicitly accepted landlord-tenant law’s distinction between a “pledge” and 
a “debt.” This is simply bizarre; section 9-207 is not a scope provision, and 
there is no evidence that the drafters viewed it as being relevant to the reso-
lution of scope issues. As to Article 9’s scope, it is sections 9-109(a)(1) and
1-201(b)(35) that are critical—and those sections thoroughly belie any con-
clusion that Article 9’s drafters blindly accepted formal distinctions ground-
ed in landlord-tenant law.84
Likewise, guideline (3)—that the Code establishes principally baseline 
rules—does not justify excluding lease security deposits from Article 9’s 
scope. One might argue, as the court essentially did in Knight, that exclud-
ing security deposits from Article 9 is appropriate because historical practice 
proves that lessors will not agree to pay interest on security deposits unless 
forced to do so by legislation.85 Thus, excluding security deposits from Arti-
cle 9 would save the parties from having to express this understanding ex-
plicitly or from having to bargain around a contrary result. By the same to-
ken, it hardly seems burdensome to obligate a lessor—who is almost inevi-
tably the master of the lease form—to make such an understanding implicit 
in its contract. This is particularly appropriate to the extent that landlord 
practice in the consumer context may reflect more about bargaining power 
inequalities than the underlying shared understandings of the parties.86
Moreover, excluding lease security deposits from Article 9 to validate a 
historical practice presents a more compelling problem—Article 9’s scope 
provision is not a baseline rule. The lease security-deposit cases allow the 
lessor to escape the impact of Article 9 merely by denominating the pay-
ment as a “deposit,” but nothing in Article 9 sanctions such a practice.
83. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text.
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III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 9 (INCLUDING DISTINCTIONS BASED ON THE 
FORM IN WHICH A SECURITY DEPOSIT IS PAID)
Although Article 9 should generally be held to govern tenant security 
deposits, it was not drafted with security-deposit transactions in mind. As a 
result, interesting—and in some instances complex—problems arise in the 
application of its provisions. First and foremost is the problem of categoriz-
ing the collateral. Although we presume that the payment of a security de-
posit in cash is relatively rare, it might be easiest to explore the issues by 
starting with the analysis of a cash deposit and contrasting the analysis for 
check or credit-card deposits.87
For purposes of the UCC, cash is “money,”88 and a security interest in 
money may be perfected only by possession.89 Although attachment can 
occur before the landlord takes possession of the money, the landlord cannot 
be certain of attachment until that time.90 Because a landlord’s security in-
terest in money is inevitably possessory in nature, attachment requires (other 
than the normal requirements that the secured party give value91 and that the 
debtor have rights or the power to transfer rights in the collateral92) only that 
the secured party take possession pursuant to agreement.93
The landlord will typically deposit the money in a bank account, and its 
right of withdrawal as a creditor of the bank constitutes proceeds of the 
money. We often think of proceeds as deriving from a disposition of collat-
87. In addition to cash, check, and credit card, a security deposit might be made using 
one of several other possible methods (e.g., debit card, wire transfer, stored-value card). Each 
of these methods is similar to a credit-card transaction in that the funds in the landlord’s 
account do not represent the proceeds of property of the debtor, and thus the analysis applica-
ble to credit-card transactions should apply equally to transactions involving these mecha-
nisms. Although we conclude that Article 9 should be held to apply to credit-card and similar 
transactions, there is a credible argument to the contrary. 
88. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(24) (2012 Official Text) (“‘money’ means a medium of exchange 
currently authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government.”).
89. Id. §§ 9-310(a), 9-312(b)(3), 9-313(a). 
90. For attachment to occur before the landlord takes possession, the tenant would have 
to authenticate a security agreement describing the collateral. Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(A). Id. § 9-
108(b)(4) provides that a description of collateral is legally sufficient if it identifies the col-
lateral by quantity, and this would seem to apply, at least by analogy, to a reference to a sum 
certain in dollars. Attachment, however, would not occur unless the tenant had enough cash 
on hand to pay the deposit, and even then the cash on hand might be dissipated and other cash 
obtained before payment of the deposit (under U.C.C. § 9-332(a), a transferee of money takes 
free of a security interest in the money unless the transferee and the debtor collude to violate 
the rights of the secured party).
91. Id. § 9-203(b)(1).
92. Id. § 9-203(b)(2).
93. Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(B).
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eral by a debtor, but revised Article 9 is not so limited.94 Pre-revision Article 
9 required that property be received by the debtor in order to qualify as pro-
ceeds,95 but this requirement has been eliminated.96
Assume for the moment that the bank account is dedicated to security 
deposits and that the landlord maintains records that enable it at any time to 
determine the amount of funds in the account attributable to each of its ten-
ants. Because the landlord’s records permit the proceeds to be identified 
notwithstanding the commingling of multiple tenant deposits, the security 
interest attaches to them.97 In our opinion, the Article 9 collateral type for 
the proceeds is “deposit account,”98 and because proceeds in a deposit ac-
count are “cash proceeds”99 the landlord’s security interest remains perfect-
ed.100 If the landlord’s records are insufficient to permit identification of the 
collateral, Article 9 permits the task to be accomplished by application of 
equitable tracing principles permitted under other law.101
There is an oddity in applying the identifiability requirement in the 
context of security deposits. If a debtor disposes of collateral and deposits 
the proceeds to its own deposit account, an inability to identify the proceeds 
harms the secured party, which loses its security interest and has nothing in 
94. Although proceeds most commonly result from a disposition of collateral, there are a 
number of contexts in which there does not need to be a disposition for proceeds to be gener-
ated. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64)(C) (2012 Official Text) (covering distributions, such as 
cash or stock dividends, distributed on account of collateral). 
95. Id. § 9-306(2) (1997 Official Text).
96. It is doubtful whether the drafters of the revision had in mind a situation in which a 
secured party generates the proceeds. The comments explain that,
[w]hen collateral is sold subject to a security interest and the buyer then resells 
the collateral, a question arose under former Article 9 whether the “debtor” had 
“received” what the buyer received on resale and, therefore, whether those re-
ceipts were proceeds. . . . [Under revised Article 9] it is necessary only that the 
property be traceable, directly or indirectly, to the original collateral.
Id. § 9-102 cmt. 13(d) (2012 Official Text).
97. Id. §§ 9-203(f), 9-315(a)(2).
98. Id. § 9-102(a)(29). A more common situation in which a deposit account constitutes 
collateral involves a debtor assigning an entire account; and in the transaction under discus-
sion, the landlord’s security interest in each tenant’s security deposit represents only a portion 
of the funds in the account. Nevertheless, the landlord’s interest is properly classified as a 
deposit account; otherwise it would constitute a general intangible as to which perfection 
would require the filing of a financing statement, an absurd result when the secured party is 
in control. Cf. Id. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d) (lessor’s assignment of right to lease payments separate 
from its rights in leased goods constitutes assignment of chattel paper).
99. Id. § 9-102(a)(9) (“‘Cash proceeds’ means proceeds that are money, checks, deposit 
accounts or the like.”). 
100. U.C.C. § 9-315(c), (d)(2) (2012 Official Text) (providing that if security interest in 
original collateral is perfected, security interest in identifiable cash proceeds is perfected). 
101. Id. § 9-315(b)(2). “Among the ‘equitable principles’ whose use other law may per-
mit is the ‘lowest intermediate balance rule.’” Id. § 9-315 cmt. 3. For more information on 
the lowest intermediate balance rule, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 202 (1959).
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its possession or control to make up for the loss. By contrast, if proceeds are 
in a deposit account controlled by a landlord, an inability to identify the 
proceeds does not deprive the landlord of them; rather, it would seem to 
convert the landlord’s security interest into an ownership interest.102 This 
leaves the tenant, who until the loss of identification owns the funds (or, if 
title has already passed to the landlord, has a property right in the funds) 
with a mere right of reimbursement that will most likely be partially or en-
tirely discharged if the landlord files a petition in bankruptcy.103 Perhaps the 
best result in this situation would be to relax the identification standards to 
the extent possible for a tenant entitled to a return of its deposit, but main-
tain the normal standards for a landlord seeking to assert its perfected status 
against a tenant’s bankruptcy trustee.
A defect of Article 9 in this context is that it does not explicitly require 
the landlord to maintain the identifiability of funds on deposit. In the case of 
collateral in a secured party’s possession, Section 9-207(a) requires the se-
cured party to use reasonable care in the custody and preservation of the 
collateral. Section 9-207(b)(3), also applicable to collateral in the possession 
of a secured party, requires the secured party to maintain the identifiability 
of the collateral but permits fungible collateral to be commingled. As to 
funds on deposit, a landlord has control rather than possession and thus the 
requirements of Sections 9-207(a) and (b) do not apply. Section 9-207(c), 
which applies when a secured party has either possession or control, does 
not contain parallel rules. Despite the omission, a court should impose a 
duty on the landlord to maintain the identifiability of a tenant’s security de-
posit through application of the obligation of good faith.104 Because the con-
sequence of an inability to identify the collateral is asymmetrical—
advantaging the landlord and disadvantaging the tenant—the concept of 
102. Even if by original delivery the tenant transferred title to the money to the landlord, 
the landlord would be a secured party, the money (and any proceeds) would be collateral, and 
the provisions of Article 9 with regard to rights and obligations of the parties would apply. 
U.C.C. § 9-202 (2012 Official Text). This means that the landlord would be obligated at the 
end of the lease term to return collateral in excess of the amount owed by the tenant. Alt-
hough Article 9 does not explicitly require a secured party to release collateral in its posses-
sion or under its control when the secured obligation has been satisfied, such an obligation 
clearly exists. See id. § 9-208 cmt. 4, which indicates that under the common law a failure to 
relinquish possession would constitute a conversion and then states that “[i]nasmuch as prob-
lems apparently have not surfaced in the absence of statutory duties under former Article 9 
and the common-law duty appears to have been sufficient, this Article does not impose a 
statutory duty to relinquish possession.” The same rationale would apply to collateral under 
the secured party’s control. 
103. See supra note 7. 
104. U.C.C. § 1-304 (2012 Official Text).
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reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing105 should be held to be ap-
plicable.
There are certain inherent risks that a tenant runs with respect to the 
deposited funds. For example, a landlord might dissipate the funds. It is 
highly unlikely that the tenant would be able to trace its funds to a third par-
ty, and even if it could do so it might not be entitled to their return.106 A risk 
that is at least partially addressed by Article 9 is the exercise by the bank 
with which the account is maintained of a right of set-off or recoupment on 
account of an obligation of the landlord to the bank. Under Section 9-340(a), 
a bank that exercises such a right has priority over the secured party107 and, 
as a type of transferee for value, would likely also take free of the tenant’s 
ownership interest. Banks generally are not permitted to exercise set-off or 
recoupment against an account if they know that the funds in the account are 
held for a special purpose, such as to pay the wages of employees or as ten-
ant security deposits. However, there is nothing in Article 9, other than the 
possible application of the duty of good faith, obligating a landlord to notify 
a bank of the source of the funds in an account maintained with the bank.
Now let’s assume that the security deposit is paid by check. Although a 
check is an instrument for purposes of Article 9 when used as collateral,108
an argument can be made that it does not function as collateral in this con-
text. The landlord has a contractual right to enforce the check against the 
tenant, according to its terms, if it is dishonored by the tenant’s bank.109 Is-
suance110 of the check does not confer upon the landlord the right to any of 
the funds in the tenant’s account. Section 3-408 makes this clear. It provides 
that “[a] check or other draft does not of itself operate as an assignment of 
funds in the hands of the drawee available for its payment, and the drawee is 
not liable on the instrument until the drawee accepts it.” If the tenant’s bank 
dishonors the check, the landlord’s rights are against the tenant, not the 
bank. Nevertheless, the check undoubtedly constitutes property of the tenant 
before issuance and if anyone stole it, including the landlord, the tenant 
would have the right to get it back. Because the check is property of the 
105. Id. § 1-201(b)(20).
106. There are numerous contexts in which security-deposit funds might be transferred. 
The degree to which a particular transferee takes free of a tenant interest in deposited funds, 
however, is beyond the scope of this article. 
107. The exercise of set-off would be ineffective against the landlord if the bank’s claim 
was against the tenant rather than the landlord. U.C.C. § 9-340(c) (2012 Official Text).
108. Id. § 9-102(a)(47) (instrument includes negotiable instrument); id. § 3-104(a), (c), (f) 
(defining check as negotiable instrument).
109. Id. § 3-414(b).
110. See id. § 3-105(a) (“‘Issue’ means the first delivery of an instrument by the maker or 
drawer, whether to a holder or nonholder, for the purpose of giving rights on the instrument 
to any person”). See also id. § 1-201(b)(15) (“‘Delivery’ . . . with respect to an instrument . . . 
means voluntary transfer of possession”).
2013] TENANT SECURITY DEPOSITS 1023
tenant, its issuance provides the landlord with a possessory security interest 
in it111 and the funds the landlord receives when its bank collects the check 
are proceeds of that security interest. The analysis for checks is essentially 
the same as the analysis for money, an appropriate result given that checks 
commonly serve as a substitute for money. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the analysis is quite different if a security de-
posit is paid by credit card. The charge slip signed112 by the tenant authoriz-
es the landlord to collect through the credit-card system, which is governed 
to a large extent by a series of contracts between the parties that operate 
within the system. After the tenant signs the slip, the landlord will send it to 
its bank, which is contractually obligated to make funds available to the 
landlord, typically at a discount. The landlord’s bank will then forward the 
slip to a clearinghouse association, which will direct it to the card issuer. 
The issuer will settle with the landlord’s bank pursuant to clearinghouse 
rules and then bill the tenant, who is contractually obligated to pay.113 Un-
like a transaction involving money or a check, no property of the tenant is 
ever delivered to the landlord. Nevertheless, in our opinion the funds in the 
landlord’s bank account should be treated as if they were the tenant’s prop-
erty based upon the tenant’s expectations and contractual obligation to pay 
the issuer, as well as the close analogy to cash and check transactions in 
which security-deposit funds constitute property of the tenant. 
If a credit-card transaction is a security transaction, the funds received 
by the landlord’s bank are the original collateral, not proceeds.114 Like a 
deposit of cash or a check, the collateral is a “deposit account,”115 but in this 
context the landlord does not get the benefit of the continuing-perfection 
rule applicable to cash proceeds. Nevertheless, the landlord’s security inter-
est is perfected from the moment of attachment without the necessity of 
taking any action. Subject to the cash-proceeds rule described above, control 
is the exclusive method for perfecting a security interest in a deposit ac-
count,116 and under Section 9-104(a)(3) a secured party has control if it “be-
111. Like money, instruments are listed in Section 9-313(a) as a type of collateral capable 
of being possessed. Accordingly, an authenticated security agreement describing the collat-
eral is not necessary for attachment to occur. Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(B). 
112. A signature in this context might be either physical or electronic. See, e.g., id. § 1-
108.
113. This brief description of the process is based on BARKLEY CLARK AND BARBARA 
CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS, ¶ 15 (revised ed. 
1998).
114. As is the case with collateral in a secured party’s possession, an authenticated securi-
ty agreement describing the collateral is not required if the collateral is in the secured party’s 
control pursuant to Section 9-104. U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(D) (2012 Official Text).
115. As noted above, it is our opinion that a part interest in a deposit account is itself a 
deposit account for purposes of Article 9. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
116. U.C.C. §§ 9-310(a), (b)(8), 9-312(b)(1), 9-314(a), 9-104(a) (2012 Official Text).
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comes the bank’s customer with respect to the deposit account.” Because the 
landlord is at all times the bank’s customer with respect to the account, per-
fection of its security interest is in effect automatic.
Because the collateral is a deposit account, a question arises whether 
the security aspect of the lease transaction is excluded from the scope of 
Article 9. Section 9-109(d)(13) provides that the article does not apply to 
“an assignment of a deposit account in a consumer transaction, but Section 
9-315 and 9-322 apply with respect to proceeds and priorities in proceeds.” 
In a cash or check transaction, the funds in the landlord’s account constitute 
proceeds and thus the exclusion by its own terms does not apply. Does it 
apply when the funds are the original collateral? The transaction at issue 
qualifies as a consumer transaction, but in our opinion there has not been an 
assignment by the debtor in the sense contemplated by the statute and thus 
the exclusion does not apply. 
In a consumer transaction, an individual incurs an obligation for per-
sonal, family, or household purposes117 and provides collateral to secure the 
obligation.118 Those requirements clearly are met in residential lease transac-
tions. In addition, the collateral must be held for personal, family, or house-
hold purposes.119 This requirement is met as well, even though the landlord 
physically holds the collateral for a commercial purpose. A typical consum-
er transaction involves the use of consumer goods120 as collateral for a con-
sumer loan, and in most instances the collateral will be in the possession of 
the debtor pending default. Surely, however, the mere fact that a debtor 
might permit a secured party to take possession of consumer goods pending 
payment of a consumer obligation would not deprive the debtor of the pro-
tections afforded consumer transactions under Article 9.121 Similarly, the 
fact that a landlord is in control of a deposit account representing a tenant’s 
security deposit should not preclude a transaction from qualifying as a con-
sumer transaction. 
In the typical transaction excluded from Article 9 by Section 9-
109(d)(13), a consumer obligor attempts to assign to a secured party an in-
terest in the obligor’s personal deposit or savings account as collateral for a 
117. Article 9 refers to such an individual as a “consumer obligor.” Id. § 9-102(a)(25).
118. Id. § 9-102(a)(26)(i), (ii). 
119. Id. § 9-102(a)(26)(iii). 
120. If the collateral is consumer goods, the consumer transaction also constitutes a con-
sumer-goods transaction. Id. § 9-102(a) (26), (24). A consumer transaction might also in-
volve the use of investment property held by the debtor for a personal, family, or household 
purpose. See id. § 9-102(a)(26).
121. The same analysis would apply if a debtor gave a secured party control of, e.g., a 
certificated security that represented a consumer investment as collateral for a consumer 
obligation. See id. § 9-106(a), 8-106(a), (b). 
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consumer obligation.122 That is not at all what happens when a landlord col-
lects a security deposit through the credit-card system; rather, the relation-
ship between the tenant and the funds in the landlord’s account—the deposit
account—is tenuous at best. Perhaps the most logical and straightforward 
conclusion would be that the funds belong to the landlord from the moment 
of collection. This alone would not prevent the application of Article 9—
under Section 2-202 the article’s provisions with regard to rights and obliga-
tions apply whether title to collateral is in the debtor or the secured party—
but only by application of Article 9 would one conclude that the tenant has 
any rights in the funds in the first place. It is difficult to see the landlord’s 
interest in the deposit account as flowing from an assignment by the tenant. 
One way to avoid the conceptual difficulties inherent in a credit-card 
transaction would be to conclude that the transaction should create only a 
debtor/creditor relationship between the landlord (as debtor) and the tenant 
(as creditor) and that Article 9 should not be stretched to cover that relation-
ship. The landlord’s obligation would be to pay the tenant, at the end of the 
lease term, the amount by which the security deposit exceeds the tenant’s 
obligations under the lease. Nevertheless, we prefer to apply Article 9 to a 
credit-card transaction because, in our view, there should not be a difference 
in treatment depending on the method by which a security deposit is paid. 
Of course, one might argue that the balance should be in the other direction; 
that is, that a cash or check transaction should create a debtor/creditor rela-
tionship and be outside the scope of Article 9. However, this would not pro-
vide a tenant with any protection in the event of a landlord’s bankruptcy. 
The better policy is for Article 9 to apply broadly to security deposits be-
cause that approach provides greater protection for tenants. 
IV. A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR THE REVISED UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL 
LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT
As noted above, the ULC is in the process of revising the URLTA. At 
the request of the Executive Director of the ULC, the authors were asked to 
serve with others in an ad hoc group123 providing advice to the drafting 
committee with regard to certain issues relating to security deposits. This 
advice, more specifically, took the form of determining the most appropriate 
mechanism for maximizing the protection of both landlords and tenants 
122. Article 9 does not invalidate the transaction; rather it simply excludes the transaction 
from its scope. Whether an assignee of a consumer’s bank account in the context of a con-
sumer loan may enforce rights in the account turns on other law. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-109
cmt. 13 (2012 Official Text).
123. The other members of the ad hoc group were Neil B. Cohen, Jeffrey D. Forchelli 
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School, and Edwin E. Smith, Esq., a partner in the law firm 
of Bingham McCutcheon LLP. 
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against creditors of the other, particularly including trustees in bankruptcy. 
The group decided against an approach under which a landlord would hold 
security deposits in trust because such an approach would require the impor-
tation of broad law-of-trust principles into landlord-tenant law. Instead, the 
group suggested a narrower approach based upon, but resolving many of the 
problems associated with, Article 9. 
Although we are of the opinion that Article 9 applies to security depos-
its, the issue is not free from doubt, especially, as noted above, in the case of 
a security deposit paid by credit card or similar mechanism. Further, while 
we are of the opinion that the exclusion from Article 9 for assignments of 
deposit accounts in consumer transactions124 is not applicable to credit-card 
transactions, that too is not free from doubt. In order to ensure that a land-
lord’s interest in a security deposit is treated as a security interest regardless 
of the source of the funds, the ad hoc group concluded that the revised 
URLTA should contain a provision to that effect. That said, there is no need 
to entirely exclude the application of Article 9, the provisions of which for 
the most part work perfectly well for security deposits. The following sug-
gested provisions are based upon the work of the ad hoc group, but in some 
instances they go beyond the group’s work to address concerns about the 
application of Article 9 that are raised in this article. The rationale for each 
provision, and in many instances the source of the language, is explained in 
the footnotes. 
Definitions:
“Bank” means an organization that is engaged in the business of bank-
ing. The term includes savings banks, savings and loan associations, 
credit unions, and trust companies.125
“Bank account” means a demand, time, savings, passbook, or similar ac-
count maintained with a bank.126
“Lien creditor,” with respect to a security deposit, means:
(A)  a creditor that has acquired a lien on the security deposit by attach-
ment, levy, or the like;
(B) an assignee for benefit of creditors from the time of assignment;
(C)  a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition; or
(D)  a receiver in equity from the time of appointment.127
124. See U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(13) (2012 Official Text).
125. The definition is the same as id. § 9-102(a)(8) (defining “bank”).
126. The definition is adapted from id. § 9-102(a)(29) (defining “deposit account”).
127. The definition is adapted from id. § 9-102(a)(52) (defining “lien creditor”).
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“Security deposit” means funds, in whatever form,128 provided to a land-
lord by a tenant as security for the tenant’s obligation to pay accrued rent 
and any damages suffered by the landlord as a result of the tenant’s non-
compliance with [Section 3.101].129
“Security interest” has the meaning set forth in [Article 1 of the UCC].130
Substantive Provisions:
(a) A landlord’s interest in a security deposit is a security interest and a 
tenant’s interest in a security deposit is an ownership interest.131
(b) A landlord must keep all its security deposits identifiable by i) hold-
ing the funds in a bank account that is used exclusively for security de-
posits, and ii) maintaining records that indicate at all times the amount of 
the funds attributable to each tenant’s security deposit.132
(c) A landlord must, in a signed record,133 notify the bank that maintains 
the bank account in which security deposits are held that the account is a 
special account for the purpose of holding tenant security deposits.134
128. The reference to “funds” without regard to their form avoids all the categorization 
problems that arise under Article 9 and are described in the preceding section of this paper. 
129. The language describing the tenant’s obligation comes from Section 2.101(b) of the 
original URLTA. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 2.101(b) (1972) 
(amended 1974). Section 3.101 of that act sets out the duties of a tenant. Id. § 3.101. The 
tenant’s duties may be described elsewhere in the revised URLTA and the appropriate refer-
ence should be inserted in the brackets.
130. The definition of “security interest” is in U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (2012 Official Text).
The relevant part of the definition is the first sentence, which states that “‘[s]ecurity interest’ 
means an interest in personal property . . . which secures payment or performance of an obli-
gation.”
131. This straightforward declaration resolves all issues about the nature of the property 
interest of both landlord and tenant. The reference to the nature of the tenant’s interest goes 
beyond the work of the ad hoc group.
132. U.C.C. § 9-207(b)(3) (2012 Official Text) requires a secured party to maintain the 
identifiability of collateral in its possession but permits it to commingle fungible collateral. 
There is no parallel provision for collateral in the secured party’s control. The suggested 
provision would in all instances permit commingling while assuring the identifiability of each 
tenant’s funds. The drafting committee for the revised URLTA might consider whether to 
penalize a landlord that fails to comply with the provision. 
133. It is assumed that the revised URLTA will contain the standard ULC definitions of 
“sign,” which includes both physical and electronic signatures, and “record,” which includes 
both physical and electronic documents.
134. The purpose of this provision is to protect security deposits from a bank’s right of 
recoupment or set-off. If the drafting committee concludes that this is not adequate, it might 
make subsection (e) subject to a new subsection, which might read as follows: “A tenant’s 
right to the return of some or all of a security deposit held in a bank account has priority over 
any right of set-off the bank with which the account is maintained may have for obligations 
owed to the bank by the landlord other than charges normally associated with the bank’s 
maintenance of the account.”
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(d) If funds attributable to a tenant’s security deposit are not identifiable 
based on the records maintained by the landlord and the tenant is entitled 
to the return135 of some or all of the security deposit, identification of the 
funds attributable to the tenant may be accomplished by a method of 
tracing, including application of equitable principles, that is permitted 
under law other than this [act] with respect to commingled funds.136
(e) All issues related to a landlord’s security interest in a security depos-
it, including attachment, perfection, the effect of perfection and nonper-
fection, the priority of the security interest with respect to the rights of a 
purchaser or creditor, including a lien creditor,137 and the rights and du-
ties of the landlord138 in enforcing its security interest, are governed by 
the provisions of [Article 9 of the UCC]139 other than [Section 9-
109(d)(13)].140
(f) For purposes of the application of [Article 9 of the UCC], a landlord’s 
security interest in funds in a bank account, without regard to whether 
the funds constitute proceeds, is a security interest in a deposit account 
as defined in [Section 9-102(a)(29)].141
135. Use of “return” rather than a word such as “reimbursement” stresses that a tenant’s 
interest in a security deposit is a property interest.
136. This provision is based on U.C.C. § 9-315(b)(2) (2012 Official Text). The UCC 
provision is designed to aid a secured party in the event the debtor commingles property other 
than goods but, as indicated supra in the text accompanying notes 106–107, a similar provi-
sion in a residential lease context should protect only the tenant. 
137. The priority rule as against a lien creditor is redundant given the cross-reference to 
Article 9 but is included for emphasis because of the importance of providing protection for 
the landlord in the event of the tenant’s bankruptcy. The tenant’s ownership interest provides 
protection in the event of the landlord’s bankruptcy. 
138. The ad hoc group took no position on the issue that was central to the cases dis-
cussed in Part II—whether to override U.C.C. § 9-207(c)(2) (2012 Official Text), which 
obligates a landlord that earns interest on a security deposit to account to the tenant for the 
interest. This policy decision is best left to the drafters of the revised URLTA.
139. The broad cross-reference to Article 9 will resolve any number of issues that might 
arise in the context of security deposits. 
140. U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(13) (2012 Official Text) excludes from the scope of Article 9 an 
assignment of a deposit account (other than an interest in proceeds) in a consumer transac-
tion. In our opinion, this provision does not apply to exclude the application of Article 9 in 
cases in which the initial collateral constitutes a deposit account (see supra text accompany-
ing notes 119–23 and the paragraph preceding the paragraph containing note 119), but ex-
cluding application of the section will negate any argument that the provisions of Article 9 do 
not apply. This provision goes beyond the work of the ad hoc group.
141. As discussed in supra notes 100 and 117 and in the text accompanying those notes, 
it is our opinion that under Article 9 a part interest in a deposit account is itself a deposit 
account. However, Article 9 does not expressly so provide and clarifying the issue is im-
portant for credit-card and similar transactions where the initial collateral consists of funds in 
the landlord’s bank account. The landlord is in control of the collateral at all times and is thus 
perfected under U.C.C. § 9-104(a)(3) (2012 Official Text), and because the landlord is in 
control an authenticated security agreement describing the collateral (which is unlikely in this 
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(g) In the event of a conflict between this [act] and [Article 9 of the 
UCC], this [act] controls.142
V. CONCLUSION
As noted above, it is our opinion that Article 9 should be applied to all 
lessee security deposits, whether the lease is of realty or of personalty. That 
said, Article 9 was not drafted with security deposits in mind and leaves too 
many questions unanswered. In particular, complex issues related to the 
characterization of the collateral and the exclusion for assignments of depos-
it accounts in consumer transactions arise when a security deposit is paid by 
credit card or a similar mechanism. It would be understandable, although 
regrettable, if some courts seized on the distinction between cash and check
transactions on the one hand and credit-card and similar transactions on the 
other hand and concluded that Article 9 applies to the former but not the 
latter. Unfortunately, most courts have used outmoded reasoning to con-
clude that Article 9 does not apply to any security-deposit transaction. These 
courts, ignoring the plain language of the article and its substance-over-form 
approach, have incorporated into Article 9 a pre-Code distinction between a 
pledge and a debt and, based on that distinction, have concluded that a secu-
rity deposit results only in a debt running from the lessor to the lessee. This 
approach is not only at odds with Article 9 itself, it is also at odds with the 
language used by the parties to express their intent—security deposit—and 
with their reasonable expectations.
The revision of the URLTA presents an opportunity for a fresh start. 
By clearly articulating that, without regard to the source of the funds that 
constitute the security deposit, the interest of a landlord is a security interest 
and that of a tenant is an ownership interest, the revised URLTA can legisla-
tively overrule the approach based on the pledge/debt analysis. As we sug-
gest above, the revised URLTA might also contain provisions that resolve 
certain other problems not clearly resolved by Article 9. For example, Arti-
cle 9 requires a secured party to keep collateral in its possession identifiable 
but does not explicitly impose the same requirement if the collateral is in the 
secured party’s control. The revised URLTA could make it clear that com-
mingling is permitted but that identifiability must be maintained in all cir-
cumstances. The revised URLTA could then default to Article 9 for most 
other issues but make clear that credit-card and similar transactions are to be 
treated as being within the scope of the article and also make clear the ap-
propriate characterization of the collateral in those transactions. 
context) is not required for purposes of attachment. Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(D). This provision goes 
beyond the work of the ad hoc group. 
142. This is necessary for the dual application of the revised URLTA and Article 9 to 
function properly. 
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In the ideal world, both Article 9 and the URLTA could be revised con-
temporaneously to resolve the problems associated with the treatment of 
residential lease security deposits. In the real world, contemporaneous revi-
sion of both statutes is impractical. Without amendments to Article 9, courts 
will continue to face the relevance of the pledge/debt dichotomy to leases of
commercial realty and of personalty. In that regard, hopefully the analysis of 
those cases that have gotten the issue right—and the analysis set forth in this 
article—will ultimately win the day. 
